• In a crisis it isn’t the severity of the underlying event that causes harm to an institution’s reputation, operations, and financial condition, but rather the timeliness and effectiveness of the response.
• Organizations are often forgiven when things go horribly wrong. But they won’t be forgiven if they’re seen not to care that something has gone wrong.

• Silence in the wake of a negative event is perceived to be indifference or validation of guilt, but ineffective timely communication can also be seen as indifference or even as dishonesty.
• Situational awareness and self-awareness are necessary precursors to effective crisis response, and organizations need structures to assure that they are sufficiently aware of the situation before publicly commenting.
• Institutions need robust and tested structures to quickly assess, analyze, and respond to crises. In the absence of such structures, leaders tend to make it up on the spot, often always in ways that are counterproductive.

THE EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY SITUATION

The body of EMU student Laura Dickinson was found in her dormitory room on December 15. Campus security and local and state law enforcement agencies responded. According to an independent report published in June, 2007,

“The condition of Ms. Dickinson’s body and room were such that, while there may have been room for varying interpretations of the scene, there were undeniably factors which raised the very real possibility that this was a homicide. These included the fact that Ms. Dickinson was found lying face up on the floor, naked from the waist down, with her legs spread and with a pillow over her face, and the fact that Ms. Dickinson’s keys were missing.” [i]

“At this point, there is no reason to suspect foul play. We are fully confident in the safety and security of our campus environment, and our campus officials will remain vigilant in ensuring safety for all members of our campus community.”[ii]

“a number of factors contributed to EMU’s failure to issue a warning about the possibility of homicide in the death of Ms. Dickinson. These include:

A. A misunderstanding of legal requirements.
B. A misunderstanding or lack of factual information.
C. A lack of active, reasoned consideration of whether a warning should be issued.
D. Uncertainty in the face of confusion and complication.
E. Lack of clear written and oral procedures.
F. A mistaken belief that a timely warning had been given.

The failure to give timely warning also cannot be excused under the rationale that no harm was done because no other incidents occurred. Members of the University community, including students, staff, and faculty, felt considerable anxiety after the arrest… In addition, there was also a sense of being misled and a feeling of distrust of the University community by its failure to give a warning or provide accurate information.”[vi]

“The findings are clear:

This University got it wrong. What happened was unacceptable. We know that many members in our community felt a breach of trust and deep anxiety because of the University's failures. On behalf of the Board, I apologize and pledge that the safety of our students, and the well-being of the entire campus community, is of paramount importance... We will make the changes necessary to better inform and protect our community."[vii]

“I, as president of Eastern Michigan University, did not, do not and will not pass the buck to anyone.

I concur with [The Board of Regents] Chairman… who, in releasing the results of the Butzel, Long report a week or so ago, stated that the University “got it wrong” in the aftermath of Ms. Laura Dickinson’s death. We did get it wrong, shamefully so.

In the 12 days since the report’s release, this administration and I have been encouraged to be silent publicly. That approach did not serve this situation well. This has given the false impression that I was indifferent to the conclusions drawn and indecisive about what my duties and obligations were.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Today, I break this silence. And this is what I have to say:
To the Dickinson family, I say, my deepest sympathies again go out to you. Laura’s death was nothing short of tragic, and this University’s actions afterward compounded your pain. I am profoundly sorry for your loss.

To the EMU community, I apologize to you and say, never again will such a confounding series of mistakes be made on my watch. Since coming here nearly two years ago, I have undertaken an array of enormously difficult personnel and policy actions that were rooted in institutional improvement and development. And I intend to continue on this course, to redouble my efforts to build trust and to position human respect as the foundation for all of our work together.

Finally, to the community at large, I say, members of this University are working hard to create a university that is noteworthy and trustworthy. Our actions, presently and in the future, will prove that we have the determination and resolve to do what is right for all and in partnership with our community.”[viii]

On July 15, five weeks after the Butzel, Long report was delivered, the Board of Regents summarily dismissed President Fallon; the director of campus security and the vice-president of student affairs also lost their jobs.

LESSONS FOR LEADERS

The EMU situation bears a disturbing resemblance to the confusion and lack of appropriate initial response by Duke University when its lacrosse team members were accused of sexual assault in the Spring of 2006 (see our assessment of the Duke response.)

• In both cases security and other university officials knew explicit details of the allegations, but failed to report them up the chain of command.
• In both cases, the university president was unaware of the inflammatory details of the allegations until after the university had already made a public comment.
• In both cases, existing incident response procedures were either ignored or poorly implemented.
• In both cases independent investigations cast a harsh light on the poor response. In the Duke case, an independent report concluded that the university was far too slow to respond to the initial incident; in the EMU case, that the initial response was misleading.

But in many ways the EMU case is more disturbing. In particular, a series of failures caused the university to mislead its stakeholders, and to continue to mislead them even though several university officials, including the heads of security and of student affairs, along with several members of their respective staffs, were well aware a) that homicide was a possibility; b) that the missing keys created a security risk for other students, and c) that the initial statements were false and misleading.

The Butzel, Long report notes that EMU had existing incident response procedures, but that these were not well-understood by those charged with using them, and that the president seemed not to inquire down the chain of command for more information.

In the wake of Duke’s scandal, Duke’s president recast crisis management procedures to assure greater situational awareness and timely notifications and decision-making. EMU’s example reinforces the need for all institutions, public and private, to have clear, robust, and tested crisis management procedures that encourage maximum situational awareness.

The lack of such structures at EMU led to another common crisis management failing: drafting in the dark. EMU’s initial communication, drafted by the out-of-town communication staffer and the president, painted a comforting scenario and was not vetted sufficiently through security. It is all too common at companies and other institutions for the communication professionals to be kept in the dark, and to be brought in to give comfort while those who know the real situation withhold critical information. In EMU’s case, not only was the communication staff in the dark, so was the president.

This initial mis-step was compounded by the failure of those who knew to make clear that the initial communication was flawed. At the very least, security and student affairs should have called immediate attention to the disparity between the statement and the situation. This would have forced the issue and made the president aware of what the university was actually dealing with.

The fact that the security department’s initial draft incident report was ordered shredded by the vice president of student affairs is particularly disturbing. The circumstances are now the subject of dispute. The suspended vice president of student affairs’ lawyer says that the order to shred came from the head of security, who denies this. The Butzel, Long report notes that in either circumstance, the student affairs vice president did not inform the president that the incident report had been shredded. In the post-Enron/Andersen environment, shredding documents that cast an institution in a negative light during an ongoing investigation is simply unacceptable, and inevitably leads to allegations of cover-up.

The university’s response to the stakeholder outrage when the arrest called into question the accuracy of prior assurances is also problematic. Instead of being straightforward and admitting that they made a mistake, university officials prevaricated and made multiple inconsistent, and in two cases false, statements. This is a common mis-step in the early phases of a crisis, and one that makes maintaining or restoring trust very difficult. In the words of Ron Alsop, the Wall Street Journal reporter who covers corporate reputation, “flailing around and looking helpless aren’t inspiring to your stakeholders.”[ix] Here the university missed an opportunity to make amends, and compounded its initial mistakes.

PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION

How can other institutions, corporate or not-for-profit, big or small, prevent similar crisis mis-steps?

The key is to recognize that bad things happen even to good institutions, and that the primary determinant of reputational and other harm in a crisis is the perception of indifference or of dishonesty in the aftermath of a crisis. A well-crafted crisis response infrastructure can prevent these perceptions and help an organization mobilize resources effectively.

Here’s a checklist to help you understand your level of preparedness:

1. Have a clear sense of what constitutes a crisis, and know how to mobilize energy and resources quickly.

• Develop an early warning mechanism/rapid response capability.
  
• Designate a senior executive as responsible for crisis preparedness and response.
  
• Make this executive accountable and provide sufficient resources to conduct a thorough analysis of vulnerabilities, crisis response strategies, and crisis implementation.
• Pre-authorize this executive to take initial response steps without going through usual corporate approval processes. 

2. Test the system with wargames, tabletop exercises, and other processes that challenge leaders to make tough decisions and act quickly.

• Remember that the best plan won’t help if executives don’t know what to do.
• After each test or live mobilization, conduct an after-action assessment to improve your processes and ability to implement them under stress.

3. Recognize when business as usual needs to be suspended. A quick test:

• Do the stakeholders who matter expect you to take prompt action?
• Will delay in taking prompt action provide an opening for your adversaries or others to define your involvement negatively?

4. Control the Agenda:

• Don’t let the media, adversaries, or the rumor mill define your situation.

5. Keep in mind the Golden Hour of crisis response:

• Incremental delays cause greater-than-incremental harm to reputation.

• How do you want your key stakeholders to think and feel, and what do you want them to know and do?
• Will your initial statement hold up to close scrutiny later?

7. In a crisis, assure both self-awareness and situational awareness: 

• Coordinate all functions of the crisis response with frequent meetings/conference calls.
• Don’t use euphemism or hide embarrassing information, but be sure those charged with crisis response know what’s going on.
• Correct mistakes early: You will make mistakes, and will be forgiven if you correct them. Be sure your correction is at least as visible and reaches the same audiences as your mistake.
• Understand what your stakeholders, adversaries, the media, and others are saying about you.

8. Keep your focus on the goal: influencing stakeholders.

• Decisions become clear when you keep stakeholders in mind.
• If people are at risk, show concern and take steps to protect them.

[i] Executive Summary of The Report of the Independent Investigation Into Eastern Michigan University's Response to the Death of Student Laura Dickinson by the law firm Butzel, Long, P.C., June 8, 2007, page 2.

[ii] Butzel, Long Executive Summary, page 3.

[iii] Associated Press, "University Officials Accused of Hiding Campus Homicide," June 23, 2007.

[iv] Butzel, Long Executive Summary, page 5.

[v] You can see the full report at http://www.emich.edu/regents/Butzel_Long_investigation/

[vi] Butzel, Long Executive Summary, page 6.

[vii] http://www.emich.edu/regents/Butzel_Long_investigation/

[viii] http://www.emich.edu/president/bor061907.html

[ix] The 18 Immutable Laws of Corporate Reputation: Creating, Protecting, and Repairing Your Most Valuable Asset, by Ronald J. Alsop, A Wall Street Journal book, Free Press, 2004, page 218.